We consider a game G n played by two players. There are n independent random variables Z 1 ; : : : ; Z n , each of which is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Both players know n, the independence and the distribution of these random variables, but only player 1 knows the vector of realizations z := (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ) of them. Player 1 begins by choosing an order z k1 ; : : : ; z kn of the realizations. Player 2, who does not know the realizations, faces a stopping problem. At period 1, player 2 learns z k1 . If player 2 accepts, then player 1 pays z k1 euros to player 2 and play ends. Otherwise, if player 2 rejects, play continues similarly at period 2 with player 1 o¤ering z k2 euros to player 2. Play continues until player 2 accepts an o¤er. If player 2 has rejected n 1 times, player 2 has to accept the last o¤er at period n. This model extends Moser's (1956) problem, which assumes a non-strategic player 1.
Introduction
For many years, scientists from di¤erent disciplines have explored the well-known "secretary problem". This is a stopping problem in which n secretaries are invited, in a random order, for an interview to …ll a secretarial position. The employer knows the number of secretaries, and is aware that the order is random. After every interview, the employer can rank the secretaries interviewed so far from best to worst without ties, and must decide whether or not to hire the last candidate. His task is to …nd a stopping rule that maximizes the probability of hiring the best secretary. The optimal stopping rule has the following form: Reject the …rst r n secretaries, and then hire the …rst secretary who is better than all the preceding ones. If no such secretary arrives after round r n ; then the best candidate was among the …rst r n secretaries, and it therefore does not make a di¤erence whether or not to hire the last secretary. For large n; the optimal choice of r n is approximately n=e; and the probability of hiring the best secretary is approximately 1=e: For a historical overview of this classical secretary problem the reader is referred to Ferguson (1989) .
The secretary problem has been extended in a number of important directions. In particular, versions have been studied in which the payo¤ depends on the rank of the selected candidate, even if he or she is not the best. This seems more realistic than the classical scenario, as hiring the second best candidate is obviously better than hiring the third best. We can further extend this situation by assuming that every secretary has a cardinal value distributed according to some probability measure, but where the payo¤ solely depends on the rank of the selected candidate (see Gnedin and Krengel (1995) and the references therein, and Bearden (2006) ). In this case, however, it is perhaps more natural to assume that the payo¤ is exactly equal to the cardinal value of the selected candidate, instead of its relative rank. For instance, if there are two secretaries with neigbouring ranks, then selecting the best amongst these two is less relevant if their values are close, and more relevant if the di¤erence in values is high. This is exactly the model as studied by Moser (1956) In the present paper we take Moser's model, but assume in addition that there is an adversary who knows the values of the secretaries, and chooses the order of the secretaries strategically. The employer, on the other hand, does not know these values, but only knows the number of secretaries, and the distribution of their respective values. We thus obtain a zero-sum game with incomplete information on the employer's side. We are not the …rst to take a game theoretic approach to the problem 1 . See, for instance, Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) , Gnedin and Krengel (1995) , and de Carvalho, Chaves, de Abreu Silva (2008) .
The adversary's main problem is how to optimally exploit his private information. This is a di¢ cult problem since the adversary, by using his private information, would make choices that would reveal part of his private information to the employer. In our analysis, however, we mainly focus on the employer, in line with the literature on the secretary problem. In particular, we will be interested in his optimal strategies, that is, strategies for which the worst-case expected payo¤ is as high as possible.
For the case of two secretaries, we show that the employer's unique 2 optimal strategy is to hire the …rst secretary precisely when her value is at least 0.5. This strategy guarantees an expected payo¤ of 7=12 to the employer. An optimal strategy for the adversary is to …rst send the secretary whose value is closer to 0.5.
If there are more than two secretaries, we are not able to …nd exact optimal strategies for the employer. However, we provide strategies with a simple structure that approach the value within a distance of at most 0.07. The class of strategies we focus on are threshold strategies, and they work as follows: For every period k choose a threshold a k , which may depend on the values of the rejected secretaries, and hire the current secretary precisely when her value is at least a k : Such a threshold strategy is called stationary if a k is constant throughout the game, except for the last period where the employer must accept the last candidate. The strategy is a Markov threshold strategy if a k depends on the period k; but not on the values of the rejected secretaries.
We show that the best stationary threshold strategy is to choose the threshold equal to (1=n) 1=(n 1) ; where n is the number of secretaries. This threshold converges (slowly) to 1 if n tends to in…nity. Interestingly, this is also the best stationary threshold strategy in Moser's model, where the order of the secretaries is not chosen strategically. We show that this stationary threshold strategy performs relatively well in general, as it approximates the value by at most 0.08.
We then turn to Markov threshold strategies. We show that the best amongst these involves thresholds that are non-increasing over time. For the case of two and three secretaries, this strategy is in fact the best stationary threshold strategy discussed above. So, for these cases choosing di¤erent thresholds over time does not yield higher payo¤s. We conjecture, supported by numerical simulations, that this remains to be true for more than three secretaries as well.
However, for at least three secretaries, we show that the best threshold strategy must base its thresholds not only on the period, but also on the values of the rejected secretaries. Nevertheless, it remains true that the thresholds should be non-increasing over time. We prove that the employer, by using such general threshold strategies, can approach the value by at most 0.07.
It turns out to be very di¢ cult to provide e¤ective strategies for the adversary. We do, however, provide some suggestions at the end of the paper.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Section 3 we describe the optimal strategy for the employer if the order of secretaries is not chosen strategically. After this section we will explore the situation where the adversary is strategic, that is, chooses the order of secretaries to his own advantage. Section 4 covers the case of two secretaries. In Section 5 we turn to the case of more than two secretaries, and examine stationary threshold strategies for the employer. General threshold strategies are explored in Section 6. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks, also on e¤ective strategies for the adversary. Some technical proofs have been moved to the appendix.
The Model
The game. Consider the following game G n , where n 2 N, played by two players. There are n independent random variables Z 1 ; : : : ; Z n , each of which is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. We assume that both players know n, the independence and the distribution of these random variables, but only player 1 knows the vector of realizations z := (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ) of them. The game is played as follows. Let N = f1; : : : ; ng. At period 1, player 1 chooses one of fz i g i2N , say z k 1 , and o¤ers z k 1 euros to player 2. If player 2 accepts, then player 1 pays z k 1 euros to player 2 and play ends. Otherwise, if player 2 rejects, play continues at period 2, where player 1 chooses one of the remaining amounts fz i g i2N fk 1 g , say z k 2 . Player 1 subsequently o¤ers z k 2 euros to player 2, who either accepts or rejects. If player 2 accepts, then player 1 pays z k 2 euros to player 2 and play ends, whereas if player 2 rejects, then player 1 has to o¤er one of the remaining amounts fz i g i2N fk 1 ;k 2 g . This continues until player 2 accepts an o¤er. If player 2 has rejected n 1 times, player 2 has to accept the last o¤er at period n.
In terms of the secretary problem as described in the introduction, player 1 corresponds to the adversary whereas player 2 plays the role of employer. The realizations of the random variables Z 1 ; :::; Z n are the values of the n secretaries.
Strategies. Let (N ) denote the set of all permutations of N . Note that player 1's pure strategy is essentially the same as just chosing one permutation in (N ) in advance, instead of choosing period by period, and to o¤er z (k) at period k. A (mixed) strategy 1 for player 1 is a decision rule which speci…es a probability distribution on (N ) for each possible vector of realizations z. 3 A strategy 1 is called pure if, for any z; it prescribes one speci…c permutation with probability 1.
At any decision point for player 2, the history observed by player 2 is the sequence consisting of all amounts that player 1 has o¤ered before the current period. A (mixed) strategy 2 for player 2 is a decision rule which assignes a probability distribution on fAccept, Rejectg to any o¤er at the current period and to any history of player 2. 4 A strategy 2 is called pure if, for any current o¤er and any history of player 2, strategy 2 prescribes either Accept with probability 1 or Reject with probability 1. Moreover, a pure strategy 2 for player 2 is called a threshold strategy if, after any history h of player 2, there exists a threshold a(h) 2 [0; 1] such that 2 prescribes to accept the current o¤er y when y a(h) and prescribes to reject it when y < a(h). If these thresholds only depend on the period, then 2 is called a Markov threshold 3 We assume throughout that 1 satis…es a standard measurability requirement with respect to the Lebesgue -algebra on [0; 1] n : 4 Again, we assume that 2 is measurable with respect to the Lebesgue -algebra.
strategy, whereas if there is just one threshold then 2 is called a stationary threshold strategy. 5 Markov threshold strategies for player 2 are given and denoted by the sequence of thresholds a := (a 1 ; : : : ; a n 1 ) for the …rst n 1 periods, whereas a stationary threshold strategy of player 2 is simply a threshold a 2 [0; 1].
Utility. With respect to a pair of strategies ( 1 ; 2 ), let U ( 1 ; 2 ) denote the expected amount that player 1 has to pay to player 2. We also refer to U ( 1 ; 2 ) as the expected utility. We evaluate every strategy 1 of player 1 by
which is the worst-case scenario for what player 1 has to pay in expectation. Similarly, for every strategy 2 of player 2, let
A strategy 1 for player 1 is called a best reply to a strategy 2 of player 2, if U ( 1 ; 2 ) = 2 ( 2 ). Similarly, a strategy 2 for player 2 is called a best reply to a strategy 1 of player 1, if U ( 1 ; 2 ) = 1 ( 1 ). Best replies always exist in pure strategies.
The value. We always have
If they are equal, then this amount is called the value of the game, and is denoted by v n . If v n exists, then a strategy 1 for player 1 is called optimal if 1 ( 1 ) = v n ; whereas a strategy 2 for player 2 is called optimal if 2 ( 2 ) = v n . Note that 1 and 2 are optimal if and only if they are best replies to each other.
One can show the following theorem based on approximating the original game by a sequence of …nite discretizations. Theorem 2.1. (Existence of value and optimal strategies) The value v n of the game G n exists. Moreover, both players have an optimal strategy.
Playing Against a Non-Strategic Player 1
In this section, we examine the situation in which player 1 does not manipulate the order of the realizations z 1 ; : : : ; z n , and simply chooses z k for period k. For every n; let 1 n denote this strategy for player 1, and let e v n denote the best utility player 2 can achieve against 1 n , i.e.
The most important properties of this situation are summarized below. Most of these were already proven by Moser (1956) .
Theorem 3.1. (Non-strategic player 1) (1) Player 2's best reply to 1 n ; unique up to a set of measure zero, is the Markov threshold strategy which, for period k 2 f1; : : : ; ng, prescribes threshold b k := e v n k . (Recall that e v n k is player 2's best utility against 1 n k ). (2) Player 2's best utility e v n satis…es the recursion e v 1 = 1 2 ; and e
The sequence e v n is strictly increasing and lim n!1 e v n = 1: (4) Player 2's best amongst the stationary threshold replies to 1 n is a n = (
e. for any stationary threshold strategy a for player 2 we have U ( 1 n ; a n ) U ( 1 n ; a). The strategy a n , while not being a best reply to 1 n for any n 3; is asymptotically a best reply, i.e. lim n!1 U ( 1 n ; a n ) = lim n!1 e v n (= 1).
Proof. First, we show part 1. Consider period 1. If player 2 decides to reject, then n 1 amounts will remain, yielding e v n 1 in expectation at a best continuation. Hence, if player 2 is o¤ered at least e v n 1 at period 1, then he accepts, otherwise he rejects. This argument holds for any later period, which proves part 1.
Next, we prove part 2. At period 1, with regard to the strategy prescribed in part 1, player 2 accepts with probability 1 e v n 1 , with conditional expected amount 1 2 (e v n 1 + 1), and rejects with probability e v n 1 . Therefore,
It is obvious that e v 1 = 1 2 , so part 2 has been veri…ed. Part 3 is simple and intuitive. Take some n 2. Then, e v n > e v n 1 because by (3.1)
Here we used that e v n 1 2 (0; 1). Since the sequence e v n is strictly increasing and e v n 1 for all n, we may conclude that lim n!1 e v n exists. By part 2,
yielding lim n!1 e v n = 1.
Finally, we show part 4. Take a stationary threshold strategy a for player 2. With probability a n 1 , we have z i < a for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g, in which case player 2 rejects all z 1 ; : : : ; z n 1 and must accept z n , yielding a conditional expectation of 1 2 . On the other hand, with probability 1 a n 1 , we have z i a for at least one i 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g, hence player 2 will accept the …rst amount above a, yielding a conditional expectation of 1 2 (a + 1). Thus, strategy a gives U ( 1 n ; a) = a n 1 1 2 + (1 a n 1 )
By taking derivatives, it easily follows that U ( 1 n ; a) has a unique maximum at a n = (
Note that U ( 1 n ; a n ) = 1 2 (1 + a n 1 n a n ); which, in view of lemma 8.2, implies
Hence, a n is an asymptotically best reply to 1 n : Finally, it is clear in view of parts 1 and 3 that a n is not optimal when n 3; since in this case di¤erent thresholds must be used at periods 1 and 2.
Remark: The following table shows an approximation of e v n for some values of n: In fact, Moser (1956) and Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) showed that e v n 1 2 n + ln(n) + b if n is large. Here, b is a constant approximately equal to 1.7680.
The Special Case of Two Random Variables (The Game G 2 )
From now on, we will focus on the situation in which there is a strategic adversary. In this section, we examine in detail the case when we have two random variables, that is, n = 2. So, player 1 must choose an order for the realizations z 1 and z 2 : In this game both players only have to make a choice at period 1. Therefore, whenever we speak about a player's choice we always mean his choice at period 1. We show the following results. Proof. Let 1 and a denote the strategies described in part 1 and part 2, respectively. It is su¢ cient to show that (1) 1 is a best reply to a; (2) a is a best reply to 1 ; unique up to a set of measure zero, and (3) the induced expected utility is U ( 1 ; a) = 7 12 . In the following, let x 1 := minfz 1 ; z 2 g and x 2 := maxfz 1 ; z 2 g:
Step 1: We show that 1 is a best reply to a. We distinguish the following cases (we assume that x 1 6 = x 2 , otherwise player 1's strategy is surely a best reply):
Case 1:
. In this case, 1 o¤ers x 2 , which a rejects, yielding x 1 as the outcome, which is the best possible amount for player 1.
Case 2:
1 2
In this case, 1 o¤ers x 1 , which a accepts, yielding x 1 as the outcome, which is the best possible amount for player 1.
Case 3:
x 2 . In this case, 1 o¤ers either x 1 or x 2 , depending on the exact values of x 1 and x 2 , but a is going to reject x 1 and accept x 2 . Thus, the outcome is x 2 . Observe that player 1 cannot achieve x 1 given player 2's threshold strategy a = 1 2 .
In conclusion, 1 is a best reply to a in all cases.
Step 2: We show that a is a best reply to 1 : It will be clear from the proof that the best reply is unique up to a set of measure zero. Suppose player 1 o¤ers some amount x (which is either x 1 or x 2 ). Let y denote the other amount.
Assume …rst that x ; in accordance with a:
Step 3: We prove that U ( 1 ; a) = completing the proof.
Remark: In the game G 2 ; player 1 in fact has many di¤erent optimal strategies, one of which is described in the theorem above. All optimal strategies coincide, up to a set of measure zero, with 1 in Cases 1 and 2 of Step 1, but may show di¤erent behavior in Case 3. The reason is that in Case 3 any behavior for player 1 is a best reply against a = 
Stationary Threshold Strategies for Player 2
In this section, we identify the best strategy that player 2 has amongst all stationary threshold strategies. It turns out that this strategy is exactly the same as the one we found in Section 3. This means that player 2, if he is restricted to stationary threshold strategies, will behave identically irrespective of whether player 1 chooses strategically or not.
Theorem 5.1. (Best stationary threshold strategy) Consider the game G n . Player 2's best stationary threshold strategy is a n = ( 
2 (a n ) 2 (a). Moreover, a n guarantees 2 (a n ) = 1 n + 1 + a n (a n ) n = 1 n + 1 + n 1 n a n :
Proof. It is clear that a = 0 or a = 1 cannot be player 2's best stationary threshold strategy. Therefore, take an arbitrary a 2 (0; 1). In order to …nd 2 (a), we identify a best reply for player 1. In the following, let x 1 ; :::; x n be a permutation of z 1 ; :::; z n such that x 1 x 2 ::: x n : We distinguish two cases: Case 1: x 1 : : : x n < a: This case occurs with probability a n , and the outcome with best play by player 1 is x 1 (player 1 should keep x 1 for the last period when it has to be accepted). The conditional expectation of x 1 is n 0 + a n + 1 = a n + 1 (cf. lemma 8.1 in appendix).
Case 2: x 1 : : : x k < a x k+1 : : : x n with some k 2 f0; : : : ; n 1g: This case occurs with probability n k a k (1 a) n k ;
and the outcome with best play by player 1 is x k+1 (all x 1 ; : : : ; x k are rejected by player 2, and the lowest amount player 2 accepts is x k+1 ). The conditional expectation of x k+1 is (n k) a + 1 n k + 1 (cf. lemma 8.1 in appendix).
So the expected utility when player 1 uses a best reply 1 to a is U ( 1 ; a) = a n a n + 1 +
Somewhat surprisingly, Lemma 8.3 guarantees that the above expression reduces to
+ a a n :
By taking derivatives, it easily follows that U ( 1 ; a) has a unique maximum at a n = (
Remark: Lemma 8.2 shows that a n = ( 1 n ) 1 n 1 converges to 1 when n tends to in…nity. Note also that the probability of the maximal amount maxfz 1 ; : : : ; z n g being at least a n is exactly n := 1 (a n ) n = 1 1 n a n .
Hence, if player 2 uses the stationary threshold strategy a n , then the probability that player 2 eventually accepts an amount above the threshold a n is also exactly n . Since n converges to 1 when n tends to in…nity, the strategy a n will accept an amount above a n with probability close to 1, for large n. This, of course, also means that 2 (a n ) converges to 1, although this also follows directly from the expression for 2 (a n ) in Theorem 5.1. The following table shows an approximation of a n and 2 (a n ) for some values of n: 
n is a very good approximation of 2 (a n ) for all n, i.e. a n+1 2 (a n ) for all n 2 and max n 2 (a n+1 2 (a n )) = a 3 2 (a 2 ) 0:006:
Regarding the comparison between 2 (a n ) and e v n (cf. Section 3), we remark that e v n 2 (a n ) for all n 2 and that max n 2 (e v n 2 (a n )) 0:08:
Since the value v n of the game G n satis…es v n 2 [ 2 (a n ); e v n ], the stationary threshold strategy a n is quite e¤ective for all n 2.
General Threshold Strategies for Player 2
In this section, we examine general threshold strategies for player 2. First we show that we may restrict our investigation to threshold strategies 2 with the following property: if 2 prescribes threshold b k at period k, and the o¤ered amount is below b k and gets rejected by 2 , then the new threshold b k+1 at period k + 1 satis…es b k b k+1 . Thus, the thresholds are non-increasing during any play. Then, e 2 has the following properties:
1. The threshold strategy e 2 is at least as good as 2 , i.e.
2. With respect to e 2 , the thresholds are non-increasing during any play: at any period k 2 and for any sequence (y 1 ; : : : ; y k 1 ) of past amounts that e 2 has rejected, we have e 2 (y 1 ; : : : ; y k 2 ) e 2 (y 1 ; : : : ; y k 1 ):
Proof. Property (2) is obvious, so we only have to show the property (1). Let 1 be a pure best reply of player 1 to e 2 . Take an arbitrary realization vector z = (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ), and suppose that 1 prescribes the realizations in the order y 1 ; : : : ; y n . Let m denote the period at which e 2 accepts y m . Thus, y m = U z ( 1 ; e 2 ) and y m e 2 (y 1 ; : : : ; y m 1 ). If m > 1, we may assume without loss of generality that y m < e 2 (y 1 ; : : : ; y m 2 ), because otherwise 1 could just as well o¤er y m already at period m 1 since e 2 would accept it. This means e 2 (y 1 ; : : : ; y m 1 ) y m < e 2 (y 1 ; : : : ; y m 2 );
which implies e 2 (y 1 ; : : : ; y m 1 ) = 2 (y 1 ; : : : ; y m 1 ):
We now show that U z ( 1 ; 2 ) = y m . Since the threshold prescribed by e 2 is never higher than the threshold prescribed by 2 , it is clear that 2 also rejects y 1 ; : : : ; y m 1 up to period m 1. But then, at period m, the strategy 2 also accepts y m in view of (6.1). Thus, U z ( 1 ; 2 ) = y m indeed.
Therefore, U z ( 1 ; e 2 ) = y m = U z ( 1 ; 2 ), which implies
completing the proof of property (1).
Corollary 6.2. Let a = (a 1 ; : : : ; a n 1 ) be a Markov threshold strategy for player 2. Then, there exists a Markov threshold strategy b = (b 1 ; : : : ; b n 1 ) for player 2 such that b k b k+1 for all k 2 f1; : : : ; n 2g and for which 2 (b) 2 (a). Consequently, a best strategy amongst the Markov threshold strategies for player 2 consists of a non-increasing sequence of thresholds. 6 The above corollary can also be shown in a more direct way. First, one can prove the following statement about transpositions of neighboring thresholds. Let a = (a 1 ; : : : ; a n 1 ) be a Markov threshold strategy for which a k < a k+1 holds for some k 2 f1; : : : ; n 2g. Let b = (b 1 ; : : : ; b n 1 ) denote the Markov threshold strategy obtained by b k = a k+1 and b k+1 = a k , while b m = a m for all m 2 f1; : : : ; k 1; k + 2; : : : ; n 1g. Then, it can be shown that 2 (b) 2 (a). Given this result, the corollary above follows by the well known theorem in algebra that any permutation can be written as a product of transpositions of two neighboring elements. Theorem 6.3. (Stationary threshold strategies are not optimal) When n 3, player 2 has a threshold strategy which is strictly better than all stationary threshold strategies.
Proof. Let n 3. In view of Theorem 5.1, it su¢ ces to construct a threshold strategy for player 2 which is strictly better than the stationary threshold strategy a = (
b be the threshold strategy for player 2 which prescribes threshold a at every period, except in the following case: at period n 1 (which is the last period when player 2 has a choice), if all n 2 previously rejected amounts are in the interval [b; a), then use threshold b at period n 1. Now we show that 2 b is strictly better than strategy a for player 2, if b is su¢ ciently close to threshold a. Let (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ) denote the realizations of the amounts. We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: Less than n 2 amounts in z 1 ; : : : ; z n are in the interval [b; a). In this case, 2 b is the same as a.
Case 2: Precisely n 2 amounts in z 1 ; : : : ; z n are in the interval [b; a). In this case, 2 b can only prescribe threshold b at period n 1 if player 1 o¤ers precisely these n 2 amounts in [b; a) at periods up to n 2. But then, for periods n 1 and n, there is no amount left in [b; a). Hence, in this case, 2 b is equally good as a. Case 3: Precisely n 1 amounts in z 1 ; : : : ; z n are in the interval [b; a). Let z denote the minimum of these n 1 amounts in [b; a) and let w denote the amount outside [b; a). We show that, with best play by player 1, strategy 2 b yields outcome z and a yields outcome w. Case 3i: w < b. In this case, with best play by player 1, strategy 2 b yields outcome z. Indeed, if player 1 o¤ers all amounts in [b; a) except z at periods up to n 2 and o¤ers z at period n 1, strategy 2 b will accept z as z b. On the other hand, w cannot be the outcome for the following reason. Player 2 would only accept w at the last period, as w < b. Thus, to achieve w, player 1 would have to o¤er the n 1 amounts in [b; a) at periods up to n 1. But then, 2 b accepts the amount at period n 1. The strategy a, on the other hand, yields w as outcome, because player 1 can reserve w for the last period, when it has to be accepted.
Case 3ii: w a. In this case, with best play by player 1, strategy 2 b yields outcome z. Indeed, if player 1 o¤ers all amounts in [b; a) except z at periods up to n 2 and o¤ers z at period n 1, strategy 2 b will accept z as z b. The strategy a, on the other hand, yields w, as a rejects all other amounts.
Case 4: All n amounts in z 1 ; : : : ; z n are in the interval [b; a). In this case, with best play by player 1, strategy 2 b yields minfz 1 ; : : : ; z n g as outcome, since player 1 can o¤er the minimal amount at period n 1. The strategy a also yields minfz 1 ; : : : ; z n g as outcome, because player 1 can reserve the minimal amount for the last period, when it has to be accepted. Hence, in this case, 2 b is equally good as a. In conclusion, 2 b is equally good as a in all cases except for case 3. On condition that case 3 occurs, we obtain the following. Recall that, with best play by player 1, strategy 2 b yields outcome z and strategy a yields outcome w. Let E z (b) denote the conditional expected value of z and let E w (b) denote the conditional expected value of w in case 3. In order to show that strategy 2 b is strictly better than strategy a, for b su¢ ciently close to a, we need to show that
Since z 2 [b; a) in case 3, we have
We calculate lim b"a E w (b) in the following way. Subcase 3i appears with conditional probability
and the conditional expectation of w is b 2 . Subcase 3ii appears with conditional probability 1 p b , and the conditional expectation of w is a + 1 2 :
Hence,
By taking the limit, we obtain
In conclusion,
which completes the proof.
Theorem 6.4. (Markov threshold strategies are not optimal) When n 3, player 2 has a threshold strategy which is strictly better than all Markov threshold strategies.
Proof. Let n 3. Take a best Markov threshold strategy a = (a 1 ; : : : ; a n 1 ) for player 2. We construct a threshold strategy 2 for player 2 which is strictly better than a. In view of Corollary 6.2 and Theorem 6.3, we may assume that a 1 : : : a k > a k+1 : : : a n 1 . It can easily be veri…ed that a 1 = 1 or a n 1 = 0 can never yield a best strategy amongst all Markov threshold strategies, and hence we assume that a 1 < 1 and a n 1 > 0:
Consider the threshold strategy 2 for player 2 which prescribes the same thresholds as a except in the following case: at period k + 1, if the rejected amount at period k was in the interval [0; a k+1 ), then use threshold a k at period k + 1. We show that, with best play by player 1, the strategy 2 is strictly better than a for player 2.
Step 1: We show that, for every vector of realizations z = (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ), the strategy 2 is at least as good as a for player 2.
Let z = (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ) be a vector of realizations. Let 1 denote a pure best reply for player 1 to 2 , and suppose that 1 o¤ers these amounts in the order (y 1 ; : : : ; y n ). Let 1 be the strategy for player 1 which also uses the order (y 1 ; : : : ; y n ), except in the following case: if y k < a k+1 and y k+1 2 [a k+1 ; a k ), then use the order (y 1 ; : : : ; y k 1 ; y k+1 ; y k ; y k+2 ; : : : ; y n ):
We show that U z ( 1 ; 2 ) = U z ( 1 ; a), which will imply that 2 ( 2 ) 2 (a): We may assume that all y 1 < a 1 ; : : : ; y k 1 < a k 1 (i.e. they are all rejected) and that y k < a k+1 , otherwise ( 1 ; 2 ) and ( 1 ; a) lead to the same outcome. We distinguish the following cases:
In this case, 2 will use threshold a k at period k + 1: Thus, both ( 1 ; 2 ) and ( 1 ; a) lead to rejections at periods k and k + 1, and hence U z ( 1 ; 2 ) = U z ( 1 ; a) .
Case 3. If y k+1 < a k+1 : Also in this case, both ( 1 ; 2 ) and ( 1 ; a) lead to rejections at periods k and k + 1, and hence U z ( 1 ; 2 ) = U z ( 1 ; a).
Step 2: We show that there exists a set W of realization vectors such that W has a positive probability and that, for every realization vector in W , the strategy 2 is strictly better than a for player 2.
Let W denote the set of realization vectors in which exactly k amounts are in the interval [0; a n 1 ); exactly 1 amount is in the interval [a k+1 ; a k ); and exactly n k 1 amounts are in the interval [a 1 ; 1]. Of course, W has a positive probability, since a 1 < 1 and a n 1 > 0: Take an arbitrary realization vector in W . Notice that, against a, it is a best reply for player 1 to o¤er the k amounts in [0; a n 1 ) at periods up to k, which all get rejected, and then at period k + 1 to o¤er the amount in [a k+1 ; a k ), which is accepted. This does not work against 2 , since in this case, 2 uses threshold a k at period k + 1. It is easy to see that 2 leads to an outcome in [a 1 ; 1], regardless player 1's strategy.
Two important questions arise:
Question (1): Which are the best threshold strategies for player 2? Question (2): Does player 2 have better strategies than threshold strategies, i.e. are there optimal strategies in threshold strategies for player 2?
Question (1) is already challenging for n = 3. The best threshold strategy for player 2 that we could …nd is the following. Let a 2 (0; 1) and b 2 (0; a) be arbitrary. Let 2 ab be the threshold strategy for player 2 which prescribes threshold a at period 1, and prescribes threshold a at period 2 if the rejected amount was in interval With the help of the program package Mathematica, with a numerical precision of 10 10 , we found the surprising conclusion that 2 a b is still a best amongst these strategies, i.e. one of the optimal choices is a = a , b = c = d = b and (a) = b, (b) = a. We do not see now how one could improve upon 2 a b . It is not even really clear to us why 2 a b is so e¤ective, although the proof of Theorem 6.3 provides some ideas. We do not know the answer to Question (2). We only know that an optimal threshold strategy exists for player 2 in G 2 , cf. Section 4.
7. Concluding Remarks 7.1. Are Markov threshold strategies really better for player 2 than stationary threshold strategies?
Notice that corollary 6.2 does not exclude the possibility that the best Markov threshold strategy is the stationary threshold strategy which we derived in Section 5. In fact, we conjecture that this holds true for all n. For n = 1 and n = 2, this is trivial, since player 2 uses at most one threshold. For n = 3, we veri…ed this conjecture in the following way. For an arbitrary Markov threshold strategy 2 = (a 1 ; a 2 ) for player 2 with non-increasing thresholds a 1 a 2 , we determined a best response for player 1, and calculated the corresponding expected outcome, as a function of a 1 and a 2 . Then, we checked that this expected outcome is indeed maximal when a 1 = a 2 = (
For n = 4 and n = 5, the program package Mathematica con…rms this conjecture (with a numerical precision of 10 -5 ). For a general n, it is di¢ cult to prove this conjecture. First of all, the proof we used for n = 3 produces huge polynomials when n is large. It seems more natural to try a proof based on induction. Perhaps, the best candidate is to try to show the following statement: if a = (a 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n 1 ) is a Markov threshold strategy for player 2 with thresholds a 1 : : : a k > a k+1 = : : : = a n 1 ;
then there is a strictly better Markov threshold strategy of the form e a = (a 1 ; : : : ; a k ; b; : : : ; b) with an appropriate threshold b 2 [a k+1 ; a k ].
E¤ective strategies for player 1
In this section, we focus on player 1. The main di¤erence is that here we have to deal with more complex strategies, as player 1 can base his decisions on the realization vector. In general for n 3, we have not been able to …nd an optimal strategy for player 1. Nevertheless, we provide some insight, and present e¤ective strategies for player 1 with a simple structure (although just o¤ering amount z k at period k for every k, as in Section 3, is already quite e¤ective, especially for large n).
Recall that, for any n 3, the value v n of the game satis…es v n 2 [ 2 (a n ); e v n ]; where 2 (a n ) and e v n are determined in Sections 5 and 3, respectively. We reiterate the approximations: (e v n 2 (a n )) 0:08; which means that the strategy for player 1 in which he o¤ers every realization z k at period k; is already 0:08-optimal. Nevertheless, player 1 can do better than e v n . Below we provide some possible improvements. Improvement 1: Based on the results for n = 2 in Section 4, there is one simple improvement for player 1 for all n 3. Let 1 n be the strategy for player 1 which, for any realization vector z = (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ), prescribes the following: At any period k n 2, o¤er z k to player 2. At the last two periods, i.e. at periods n 1 and n, play the strategy found in Section 4 with the two remaining amounts z n 1 and z n . Now we determine u n :
according to Theorem 4.1. We proceed by calculating u 3 . Just as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, player 2 should accept the o¤ered amount y at period 1 if y v 2 = 7 12 , and reject it otherwise. Thus, player 2 accepts y with probability 1 v 2 and with conditional expected amount 1 2 (v 2 +1), and rejects with probability v 2 . Therefore,
Using this argument inductively, we obtain for all n 3 that
We obtained a similar recursion for e v n in Theorem 3. 
2 (a n )) 0:07; (7.1) which means that 1 n is 0:07-optimal for player 1. Improvement 2: Recall from Section 4 that, for n = 2; it was optimal for player 1 to choose the amount closer to 1 2 . We now try to generalize this strategy for n = 3. Take some w 2 [
w be the strategy for player 1 which, for realizations z 1 ; z 2 ; z 3 , prescribes the following: At period 1, player 1 should o¤er the amount closest to w. If this amount is rejected, then at period 2, player 1 should o¤er the amount amongst the two remaining amounts which is closer to w.
Suppose that, against 1 w , player 2 uses a pure threshold strategy 2 w . (One can show, based on the discussion below, that player 2 has a best reply in threshold strategies.) Let a w denote the threshold prescribed by 2 w at period 1. If 2 w rejects amount y 1 2 [0; a w ) at period 1, it is relatively easy to determine the best threshold for period 2. Let y 2 and y 3 denote the amounts chosen by 1 w for periods 2 and 3. We distinguish the following cases. Case 1 : If y 2 w. In this case, since y 3 is not closer to w than y 2 , we have either y 3 2 [y 2 ; 1] or y 3 2 [0; 2w y 2 ]. This gives a conditional expectation of y 3 equal to
(1 y 2 ) + (2w y 2 ) :
As w 
Here, player 2 should accept y 2 exactly when y 2 d 3 , which is a quadratic inequality. By backwards induction, it would be possible to calculate the best threshold a w for period 1. We have found the following, with the help of a simulation with the program package Mathematica:
1. This also yields a possible improvement for player 1 for all n 4, just as above. Let 1 n be the strategy for player 1 which, for any realization vector z = (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ), prescribes the following: At any period k n 3, o¤er amount z k to player 2. At the last three periods, play the strategy 1 0:59 with amounts z n 2 ; z n 1 and z n . With a similar calculation as before we …nd the following approximate values of ( 1 ( 1 n ) 2 (a n )) 0:065:
We do not know whether, for n > 3, a strategy similar to 1 w would be e¤ective for player 1.
The value v n and optimal strategies
Except for n = 2 in Section 4, we have not been able to determine the exact value v n of the game G n and to …nd optimal strategies for the players. Nevertheless, we know that v 2 = 7 12 and that v n is strictly increasing in n and converges to 1 as n tends to in…nity. For an estimation of v n , we may use the interval I n = [ 2 (a n ); 1 (
The length of I n is at most 0:07, in view of (7.1), and converges to 0 as n tends to in…nity. Consequently, the stationary threshold strategy a n is 0:07-optimal for player 2 and the strategy 1 n is also 0:07-optimal for player 1. Note that, at the end of Sections 6 and 7.2, we provided possible improvements on these strategies (i.e. 2 a b for n = 3 and 1 n for n 3), which also yield in turn a better estimate for the value v n . We remark that, when n = 1 (i.e. the case of countably in…nite random variables), the value equals v 1 = 1 and any strategy of player 1 is optimal, whereas player 2 has only near-optimal strategies. . Let W denote a random variable having a uniform distribution on interval [0; 1]. Then, its density f W (t) is given by f W (t) = 1 for t 2 [0; 1] and f W (t) = 0 otherwise. Also, its cumulative distribution F W (t) = P(W t) is given by F W (t) = 0 if t < 0; and F W (t) = t if t 2 [0; 1] and F W (t) = 1 if t > 1.
Appendix
As for W , we clearly have F W (t) = 0 if t < 0 and F W (t) = 1 if t > 1, whereas for t 2 [0; 1] F W (t) = P(W t) = 1 P(W > t) = 1 P(fW i > t 8i 2 f1; : : : ; mgg) = 1 (P(W > t)) m = 1 (1 F W (t)) m = 1 (1 t) m :
Hence, f W (t) = 0 if t < 0 or t > 1, while for t 2 [0; 1]
So, n k a k (1 a) n k (n k) a + 1 n k + 1 = 1 n + 1 + a a n : (8.1)
